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 Fallibility and Sequential Decision-Making
 by
 Winston T. H. Koh*
 Individuals typically make errors in evaluating information. In this paper, we
 consider a project selection problem, where fallible managers screen projects
 sequentially, and provide independent opinions on its quality. We compare the
 relative performance of the hierarchy and polyarchy when η (n > 2) managers
 are employed to evaluate projects. In addition to generalizing the existing
 results on the optimal screening standards, I discuss and characterize the opti-
 mal organizational size, and how the relative desirability of the two sequential
 decision processes are affected by changing the project quality. Finally, I also
 discuss the effect of variable evaluation costs on the optimal evaluation stan-
 dards. (JEL: D 81)
 1. Introduction
 There are two basic reasons why collective decisions are desirable. Firstly, if
 individual interests diverge, making collective decisions is the only way to
 resolve conflicts and make compromises. Secondly, an individual's ability to
 make correct decisions or undertake complex tasks is limited. Collective deci-
 sion-making is a means to overcome limited individual rationality. To take a
 concrete example: in big organizations, major decisions regarding production,
 marketing strategies and investment plans, etc, are often jointly made by a team
 of managers, whose goal is to improve the organization's performance in the
 market-place. Each manager does not have all the information necessary to
 make a good decision, so joint decision-making is advantageous. Different
 managers contribute different pieces of information, and, as the saying goes,
 "two heads are always better than one." If the limitation on individual decision-
 making is the lack of information, then by assigning individuals to collect
 different parts of the relevant information for which they have expertise, and
 structuring suitable exchanges of information, perfect decisions are possible.
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 However, individuals are fallible and they make errors in collecting and com-
 municating information, and making judgements.
 Mistakes are made partly because it is too costly to collect and process all the
 information. Furthermore, communication is usually costly and time-consum-
 ing. What is often communicated is a message of lower dimension. For instance,
 the individual is required only to cast a vote in favor or against some project
 under consideration. In general, individuals communicate their information
 more fully, but better communication brings with it the possibilities that infor-
 mation may be purposely distorted, censored or withheld, generating incentives
 problems. The implications of fallibility are discussed in the work of Sah and
 Stiglitz [1986] and Koh [1992]. An important implication is that different
 decision structures would amplify or mitigate the human errors and biases in
 different ways, and even if the decision environment is constant, changing the
 organizational structure can have significant impact on the performance of the
 management.
 In their seminal work of fallibility, Sah and Stiglitz [1986] were interested
 primarily in studying the desirability of different arbitrary organizational struc-
 tures - hierarchies, polyarchies, and committees - using a two-manager binary-
 signal model in most of their analysis. Koh [1991] and [1992] extended some of
 the results, using a continuous-signal model. Koh [1992] also provided a prelim-
 inary analysis of incentive problems in the presence of fallibility. Other related
 work on the subject of fallibility include Bull and Ordover [1987], Geanako-
 plos and Milgrom [1992], and Meyer [1991]. In Bull and Ordover [1987],
 the authors looked at how market competition affected the size and structure
 of organizations and derived various comparative statics results relating the
 optimal size of organizations to the market parameters. Geanakoplos and
 Milgrom [1992] constructed a model of hierarchical decision-making based on
 the idea that managers are limited in their ability to evaluate because of a time
 constraint. Managers must divide their time between observing various
 parameters under their control. Meyer [1991] studied a model of learning by an
 organization when it only has coarse information available. Refining the infor-
 mation is not feasible due to fallibility. Instead, the organization adopts an
 information structure that maximizes its learning, given the coarseness of the
 information. In particular, Meyer [1991] shows that the organization can en-
 hance its learning about a worker's ability by introducing bias into the interpre-
 tation of the binary signals it receives about the worker's performance.
 In this paper, we present an analysis of the optimal decision-making process
 when management is fallible. Our analysis goes further than Sah and Stiglitz
 [1986] and Koh [1992], both of which study the relative desirability of two
 sequential decision processes - hierarchy and polyarchy - using a two-manager
 model. In this paper, we extend the analysis to more than two managers. In
 section 2, 1 describe a variation of the project selection problem, which forms
 the framework of analysis in Sah and Stiglitz [1986] and Koh [1992]. Section 3
 compares the performance of the hierarchy and the polyarchy, when η (n > 2)
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 managers are employed to evaluate projects. We disregard incentive problems.
 In addition to generalizing the existing results on the optimal screening stan-
 dards, I also discuss and characterize the optimal organizational size, and look
 at how the relative desirability of the two sequential decision processes are
 affected by changing the project quality. The results obtained on these two
 aspects are new, and form the paper's main contribution to the growing litera-
 ture on organization theory. I also discuss the effect of variable evaluation costs
 on the optimal evaluation standards. Section 4 concludes the study.
 2. The Project Selection Model
 Projects arrive randomly at a firm, which must decide whether to undertake it
 or not. There are two types of projects: (G)ood projects which yield a payoff of
 nGA if accepted, and nGR if rejected; (B)ad projects which yield a payoff of nBA
 if accepted, and nBR otherwise. We assume nGA > nBR > nGR > πΒΑ, so
 that the optimal decision is to accept good projects and reject bad projects,
 and that accepting good projects is more profitable than just rejecting bad
 projects. The fraction of good projects is a. A measure of the quality of the
 project pool is:
 m U ß- efa^-rcg*} m U ß- Ο - «) {*br - *ba} '
 The expected payoff per project is anGA + (1 - ct)nBA when they are always
 accepted, and ocnGR + (1 - α)πΒΚ when they are always rejected. Hence,
 β > ( < ) 1 implies that always accepting (rejecting) yields a higher payoff. A
 project pool is said to be of high (low) quality if β > (<)1.
 Managers are hired to evaluate projects, and they have the expertise to
 evaluate project quality, but not perfectly. If he exerts a (fixed) effort, he observes
 a signal 0e[0 ", 0 +], which is imperfectly correlated with the project quality Q
 (= G or B). The imprecision of the signal is one reason the firm may wish to
 have a second opinion. The signal 0 indicates project quality in the sense: let
 /(0|β), be the density function of 0 conditional on Q, where f(6'Q) > 0 for all
 Θ. We assume that/(0|Q) satisfies the montone likelihood ratio condition (ML-
 RC), i.e./(0|ß)//(0| G) is decreasing in 0. As is well known, MLRC implies that
 f(0'G) dominates f(0'B) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
 Hence, F(9'G) < F(6'B), which means that we are less likely to observe low-
 valued signals for good projects than for bad projects.
 Managers have identical preferences represented by a utility function, addi-
 tively separable into an income component U(Y), and an effort component V,
 which is the disutility from exerting effort to observe 0. Managerial actions are
 unobservable. Communication is also costly and time-consuming; managers
 are only required to communicate a single summary statistic of their opinion:
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 "accept" or "reject." Project payoffs are, however, common knowledge, so that
 contractual arrangements can be made contingent on the project payoffs. We
 assume there are no incentive problems.
 The strategy for a manager is to choose a cutoff point r such that he votes in
 favor of the project if he observes a signal 0 greater than r, and votes against
 acceptance otherwise. The probability that a project of quality Q will be accept-
 ed is P(0 > r ' Q) = [1 - F(r'Q)]. Clearly, P(0 > r' Q) is decreasing in r, and by
 MLRC, Ρ(θ > r'G) > Prob(0 > r'B).
 2.1 The One- Manager Case
 To understand the basic problem facing managers, consider the case when one
 manager is hired, and he sets a cutoff point r. This is the problem studied by
 Lambert [1986]. Denote the probability that an accepted project is of quality
 Ô by P(Q'0 > r), so that by Bayes Rule, P(G'0 > r) = ocP(0 > r'G)/P(0 > r),
 where P(0 > r) = α P(0 > r'G) + (1 - ol)P(0 > r'B) is the unconditional prob-
 ability of accepting a project. P(B'0 > r) = 1 - P(G'O > r). The probability
 that a rejected project is of quality Q, denoted P(Q'0 < r), is similarly defined.
 The expected projects payoffs conditional on acceptance is Π(θ > r) =
 P(G'Q > r) nGA + P(B'0 > r) πΒΑ, while expected payoffs conditional on rejec-
 tion is Π(0 < r) = P(G'0 < r)nGR + P(B'0 < r)nBR. The unconditional expect-
 ed payoff is
 n(r) = P(0 > r) Π(θ > r) + P(0 < r) Π(0 < r)
 (2) =«{nGA-F(r'G)[nGA-nGR]}
 + (!-«) {*ba + F(r'B) [nBR - nBA]}
 Absent incentives problems, the manager chooses r to maximize Π (r).
 Since / (r'B)/f (r'G) decreases with r, Tl(r) is single-peaked. Therefore
 wherer* = argmax77(r).ByMLRC,/(0-|5)//(Ö-|G) > 1 >/(0+|ß)//(0+|G).
 Corner solutions occur when β > f(0~'B)/f(0~'G), portfolio quality is suffi-
 ciently good so that r* = 0" or when β <f(0+'B)/f(0+'G), portfolio quality
 is sufficiently bad so that r* = θ+. In either case, it is unnecessary to hire a
 manager to screen projects.
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 Therefore, having more information about individual projects is not always
 necessary, when the portfolio quality is either very bad or very good. It is only
 in an intermediate range that evaluation is beneficial. However, even if r* is
 interior, it only pays to hire the manager when Π (r*) - Y > max {Π(θ~' Π(θ+)},
 where Y, the amount paid the manager, satisfies U(Y) - V= U, and U is the
 reservation utility.
 The result can be cast differently. Suppose β > 1, so that undertaking a
 project now yields a positive expected payoff. However, there is value to gath-
 ering more information about the individual project if β is less the threshold
 f(6~'B)/f(0~'G). Delaying investment and waiting for further information is
 beneficial in this case. This is similar to the insight in the recent literature on
 investment under uncertainty (see Dixit [1992]), although in the present frame-
 work, information must be generated at a cost.
 3. Sequential Decision- Making: Hierarchy Versus Polyarchy
 When two or more managers are employed to screen projects, it matters how
 their opinions are aggregated, whether one manager has veto power over others,
 and if there are variable costs (e.g. research expenses). Sah and Stiglitz [1986],
 [1988] and Koh [1991], [1992] have attempted to analyze the properties and
 performance of simple decision processes such as the hierarchy, polyarchy and
 the committee. Here, I want to develop the analysis of sequential decision-mak-
 ing in fallible hierarchies and poly archies. A number of new results are obtained.
 Following Sah and Stiglitz [1986], let us define a polyarchy as a sequential
 decision process where decision makers can recommend projects independently.
 Authority is decentralized in the sense that a project which fails one evaluation
 gets a second chance with the next reviewer. The process of submitting papers
 to academic journals fits this description of the polyarchy. By contrast, author-
 ity is more concentralized in a hierarchy (again, following Sah and Stiglitz
 [1986]) in the sense that only one manager can recommend projects for accep-
 tance while other managers down the chain of command provide (unanimous)
 decision support. The authority structure in big corporations fits this descrip-
 tion of the hierarchy.
 Suppose η managers are employed, and they are labelled 1 to n. Although
 evaluation is sequential, it is not necessarily the case manager i will be the ith
 reviewer for a project (if the project gets to him at all). This is true if the
 evaluation sequence can start with any manager. In what follows below, we
 shall assume that the evaluation sequence can start with any manager, and that
 managers do not know the evaluation history of any project that comes to him.
 This ensures that there exists a symmetric solution for the optimal evaluation
 standards.
 In a hierarchy (H), a project is accepted if and only if every manager approves
 of it. In a polyarchy (P), a project is rejected if and only if it is rejected by every
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 manager. For a project of quality Q, the probabilities that it will be accepted in
 a hierarchy and polyarchy are, respectively,
 Π {l-F(ri'Q)} and 1- Π F^IQ),
 i=l i = 1
 where η is manager i's cutoff point. Assuming no incentives problems and no
 variable costs, the fixed evaluation costs per project is η times a ma ager's
 salary. Let r = (rl,...,rn) and IJs(r9n) denote the gross expected profits per
 project for the decision process 5:
 nH(r, n) = <x{nGA + 77 {1 - F(ri'G)}(nGA - nGR)}
 + (1-«)'{πΒ*- Π {l-F(ri'B)}(nBR-nBA)}
 i=l
 (5) 1 ' n
 ( ) 1 ' IJp(r, n) = a{nGA - Π F(ri'G)(nGA - nGR)}
 i=l „
 + (1-a) {*br+ Π F(ri'B)(nBR-nBA)}.
 i=l
 Let r_, = (r j,..., rt_ly ri+ j,...., rn). By MLRC, it is straightforward to show (as
 in the one-manager case) the /7s(r, ή) is single-peaked in rh given r_f. Manager
 i chooses r, to maximize IIs (r, ri), given r_,. Let manager i's optimal cutoff point
 be rf . Given our assumption that the evaluation sequence can begin with any
 manager, and that managers are not aware of the evaluation history, symmetric
 solutions to rf exist, and since we are interested in comparing optimal cutoff
 points, we focus our attention on the symmetric optimal cutoff point rs. If rs is
 an interior solution, it is given by
 f(rH'B)[l -F(rH'B)]n-' f{rp'B)F(rp'B)n~l
 K) f(rH'G)[i -F^IG)]"-1 P f(rp'G)F(rp'G)n-1 '
 Lemma Î :
 f(0'B)[l -FWIB)]"-1
 [a] f(e'G)[i-F(e'G)r> 1S decreasins in Θ and increasins in »;
 f(f)' fí' Flf)' fí'n~ ^
 lb] f(e'G)FWGr> ÍS deCrCaSing Ín ° and n;
 f(0'B)[l -F{e'B)]»-' f(e'B)F(0'B)»-1
 LJ f(e'B)[l-F(0'G)r-1 /(fllG)F(fllGr1"
 Proof: Using MLRC.
 Lemma 1 and (6) imply that rH < rp, when at least one of them is an interior
 solution. The intuition is as follows: In a hierarchy, each manager knows that
 a project that he approves will either be rechecked by another manager, or has
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 already been approved by another manager. In a polyarchy, a manager's ap-
 proval would not be rechecked by another, and the project he receives may
 already have been rejected before by other managers. Intuitively, therefore, the
 optimal cutoff point in a polyarchy should be higher than in the hierarchy. This
 result generalizes the result in Sah and Stiglitz [1986] and Koh [1992], for a
 two-manager setting.
 It also follows from Lemma 1 that if project quality improves (i.e. β is now
 higher), rs should be lowered. If there are more managers and project quality
 is unchanged, r11 should be lowered and rp raised, since screening becomes more
 (less) stringent in a hierarchy (polyarchy) with more managers. The optimal
 cutoff point must be lowered (raised) to compensate for this.
 3.1 Comparison of Comparative Advantage
 Below, I derive the conditions for rH and rp to be interior solutions. Comparison
 of these conditions suggests that the polyarchy has a comparative advantage
 over the hierarchy as project quality improves. Lemma 1 and (6) implies that rH
 is interior if
 f(e+'B)[l-F(e+'Brl f(Q-'B)[l-F(e-'B)rl
 f(e+'G)[l-F(e+'G)rl f(0-'G)[l-F(0-'G)r1'
 By L'Hôpital rule, the above condition simplifies to
 m U) ne+'Br p ne-'B) m U) ne+'GT p f(9-'G)-
 Similarly, rp is an interior solution if
 W /(0+IG) P f(O-'GT'
 The conditions in (7) and (8) imply that both rH and r1* are interior if and only
 if
 m {) ί(θ+'Β) /(Θ-'Β)  {) /(ΟΊΟ fiß~'G)
 since by MLRC,/(0-|£)//(0~|G) < 1 <f(0+'B)/f(0+'G). The condition in
 (9) is exactly the same as the condition in (4) for the one-manager case. This
 implies that if expected gross payoffs can be improved by employing one man-
 ager, then the hierarchy and the polyarchy are both feasible decision processes,
 since r5 is interior.
 Suppose project quality is sufficiently good so that screening is not required
 in the one-manager case; i.e. β >/(θ~ 'B)/f(0~'G). The conditions in (7) and
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 (8) imply that expected gross profits can only be improved by a polyarchy.
 Similarly, if project quality is such that β < f(0+ |B)//(0+ |G), only a hierarchy
 can improve expected payoffs. This suggests that the polyarchy (hierarchy) is a
 better organizational structure when the project quality is high (low).
 The intuition is that since [1 - Fn(r' Q)] > [1 - F(r' β)]π, it follows that if both
 structures adopt the same cutoff point, the polyarchy has a higher probability
 of accepting a project compared with the hierarchy. The Type-I error (of reject-
 ing a good project) is lower for the polyarchy while the Type-II error (of
 accepting a bad project) is lower for the hierarchy. The comparative advantage
 of the hierarchy is therefore in evaluating low-quality projects, while that of the
 polyarchy is in evaluating high-quality projects. In section 3.2, we provide
 another example to show that the ranking of the hierarchy and polyarchy is not
 necessarily "monotonie" in project quality.
 3.2 Optimal Size of the Organization
 Let r£ denote the optimal cutoff point for η managers, and ns(r%, n) denote the
 expected gross profits (defined in (5)) when rsn is used. Treating η as continuous,
 and using the Envelope theorem, we differentiate nH(r", n) with respect to η to
 obtain
 (10) Slgn [-ΛΓ-] = Slgn |l-FW|C)}-In{l-F(^|G)} " ß' '
 Using the equilibrium condition in (6), this implies that
 „,, g^>(<), an '^P-;W»>(<)1| d In {In [1 - F(r"'B)} an d In {In [  - F(r"'B)}
 where ln[l - F(r'Q)] is the log-likelihood of observing Θ greater than r given
 project quality Q.
 Hiring more managers lowers the optimal cutoff point in the hierarchy,
 thereby increasing the probability of accepting both types of projects. The
 condition in (1 1) says that increasing the size of the hierarchy improves expected
 gross payoffs if and only if the proportional increase in the log-likelihood of
 accepting good projects is greater than the proportional increase in the log-
 likelihood of accepting bad projects. For the polyarchy, the equivalent condi-
 tions is:
 <« ^>«>-£»«>>'·
 The condition in (12) says that expanding the polyarchy improves gross payoffs
 if and only if the proportional increase in the log-likelihood of rejecting good
 370 Winston T. H. Koh ΛΠΤΠΞ
 projects is less than the proportional increase in the log-likelihood of rejecting
 bad projects, when the optimal cutoff point is raised.
 Define ns = argmax /7s (r£, ή), so that ns provides the upperbound to the
 optimal organizational size, which will be smaller than ns because the additional
 costs incurred in hiring more managers were not considered in the computation
 of ns. The next result shows that ns is finite, which in turn implies that the
 optimal organization size is finite. By definition,
 (13) IJs(rl ns) > Max {/7(0+), Π(Θ~)} ,
 where Π(Θ+) and Π(Θ~) denote, respectively, the expected payoffs from always
 rejecting and always accepting projects. If ns is sufficiently large, then by (6) and
 Lemma 1, rH is close to 0, and r1* close to 0+. Therefore, the limit of IJs(r%, ns)
 is max {/7(0+), 77(0")}. The same level of expected gross payoff can be replicat-
 ed by either accepting or rejecting projects.
 It is straightforward to show that the optimal organizational size is also
 sensitive to project quality. An improvement in quality, measured by β, increas-
 es expected gross profits even if the optimal cutoff points are unadjusted; the
 increase is greater when the optimal cutoff points are adjusted. However, it is
 ambiguous if better project quality implies hiring fewer managers. This is be-
 cause the higher manpower costs can be offset by the higher profitability result-
 ing from tighter evaluation.
 3.3 Comparative Organizational Performance
 The conditions (7) and (8) imply that, without restrictions on organizational
 size, the hierarchy dominates the polyarchy in terms of profitability if
 0 < ß<f(e+'B)/f(0+'G), and is dominated by the polyarchy if β >/(Θ'Β)/
 /(0-|G).Intheintermediaterange,/(0+|JB)//(0+|G)<j5</(0-|5)//(0-|G),
 both structures are feasible. When optimal cutoff points are used, we can show
 that for η hired managers,
 To interpret the condition, note that the numerator in (14) is a measure of the
 comparative advantage of the hierarchy over the polyarchy in rejecting bad
 projects, while the denominator is a measure of the comparative advantage of
 the polyarchy over the hierarchy in accepting good projects. If the ratio of the
 comparative advantage is greater (smaller) than project quality, then the hier-
 archy (polyarchy) yields higher expected gross payoffs. We illustrate the com-
 parison with two examples.
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 Examplel. F(0|B) = 0 and F(0|G) = 02; 0e[O, l]. Two managers. For
 β e (0.5, oo ), both rH and rp are interior solutions:
 η f1 Π05 ί ρ ί1!05
 ΠΗ(τΗ) > (<)np(rp)o2ß5 + 4ft4 + 16ft3 - 7ft2 + 6ft - 1 > (<) 0 .
 Clearly, the polyarchy dominates the hierarchy for ft e (0.5, oo).
 Example 2. F (Θ'Β) = 0.5(3 - 0)0 and F(0|G) = 0.5(1 + 0)0; 0e [0, 1]. Two
 managers. For β e (1/3, 3), both rH and rp are interior solutions:
 ^ _ 7 + 5ft(l +9j32 + 134ff)0·5 ^p Γ " _ 3(3 + β) - (β2 + 9 + 134ft)0·5 4(1 -ft) ^p Γ _ " 4(1 -ft)
 We are able to show that
 nH(rH) > Πρ(^) if ft g (1/2, 1) or ft e (2, 3)
 77" (r") < 77^) if ft g (1/3, 1/2) or ft g (1, 2)
 77" (r") = ^(r^) if ft = 1/2, 1 or 2.
 Hence, the two organizational types are profitable over different ranges of
 project quality.
 3.4 Variable Evaluation Costs
 If project evaluation involves a fixed sequence, i.e. manager i is always the ith
 manager to evaluate a project, and there are variable expenses (e.g. research fees)
 that are proportional to the number of evaluations, there are no symmetric
 optimal cutoff points. It is straightforward to show that the optimal cutoff
 points for the hierarchy should become lower for managers further up the
 evaluation sequence. For the polyarchy, the opposite is true. Suppose each
 evaluation incurs a cost of /. Denote expected variable costs, given
 r = (rlf...,rj, by Vs >, n) · I, where
 VH(r, n) = 1 + α {Y 77 [1 - F(rt'G)]' + (1 - α) {Υ Π [1 - F(r£|jB)]|
 Vp(r, n) = 1 + α {Y 77 F(r,.|G)l + (1 - a) {Y 77 F(rf|£)}.
 W=l i=l J l/=l i=l J
 Denote expected profits, net of evaluation costs, by Ws(r, η):
 (16) Ws(r, η) = 77s(r, η) - Vs {r, η)Ί-ηΥ,
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 where Fis the salary of one manager, and IJs(r, ri), the expected gross profits,
 is defined earlier in (5). Let ι* be the vector of optimal cutoff points. Assuming
 interior solutions for all, each optimal cutoff point rf , given rs_k, is characterized
 by the first-order condition:
 dWs(r,n)
 - _
 àrk ^
 where
 dnH(r l> n) ' (17) l> n) ' = -af(rk'G)AG Π [l-F(r,|G)]
 Wk J=Uj*k
 + ('-oi)f(rk'B)AB Π [l-F(rj'B)]
 j=l,j*k
 dVH(r,n) "-1 J
 dVH(r,n) „V =-« Σ nil-FfolOl/folG)
 orfc ;=Λ-ι,=ι
 -(1-α) V nil-FírJBH/írJB)
 ;=fc-l i=l
 an^(r, ") = _g/(rt|G)Jc π f( |G) Ork 7=1. J**
 + (1 - a)/(rt|B)JB A F(r,|B)
 J=l, J#*
 -l =« ^ /7 F(r,|G)/(r,|G)
 orfc j = k - 1 i = i
 + (1 - α) "σ1 77 F^IBB/írJB)
 j = fc- 1 i=l
 and AG = [nGA - nGR] and AB = [nBR - nBA].
 There are no symmetric solutions to r5. To see this, suppose to the contrary,
 that rk = Tj for some k > 1. From (17),
 dns(r,n) _dns(r,n) dVs(r, n) dVs(r,n)
 drk 9rj drk 9rx
 when the derivatives are evaluated at r5, contradicting the assumption that
 r^ = rf . Furthermore, in the hierarchy, rf+1 < r" . We prove the result by con-
 tradiction. Suppose rk > r? for fc > 1. Interchange the two cutoff points and let
 r~ denote the new vector of cutoff points. From (17),
 W"^, n) - WH(r~, n) = VH(r~, ή) - F^r5, n) < 0
 contradicting that r5 is optimal. Similar arguments can be used to show that in
 the polyarchy, r? < rf+í. The intuition is straightforward. Suppose cutoff points
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 of individual managers are fixed. Expected gross payoff in either the hierarchy
 or the polyarchy does not depend on how the managers are arranged. However,
 variable evaluation costs are sensitive to the arrangement of managers. The
 optimal arrangement for each organizational structure must minimize the vari-
 able costs: in the hierarchy, the manager with the highest cutoff point screens
 projects first, followed by the manager with the second highest cutoff point, and
 so on. In the polyarchy, the arrangement is the opposite, the manager with the
 lowest cutoff point screens projects first.
 The result would also hold in the absence of variable evaluation costs, but
 with a fixed evaluation sequence. In the hierarchy, the prior project quality of
 manager i + 1 is the posterior project quality of manger i. Since manager i + 1
 gets to screen a project if it has been approved by manager i, the prior quality
 of manager i + 1 is higher than that of manager i. With a better prior, manager
 i + 1 should set a lower cutoff point. In the polyarchy, manager i + 1 only
 screens projects rejected by manager i. Hence, his prior is lower than that for
 manager i. Manager ί + 1 should set a higher cutoff point.
 The results have a similar flavor to the main finding in Meyer [1991], which
 shows that in deciding between two workers for promotion, when ability is
 unobservable and only rank-order information about output is available, the
 firm should bias the comparison - the gap between output - in favor of better-
 performed worker in later rounds of assessment. The same principle underlies
 both Meyer's analysis and the problem here: with a better prior in the later
 rounds, evaluation standards for the better project/worker should be less strin-
 gent.
 There are no general results on the comparison of the relative profitability of
 the hierarchy and polyarchy when there are variable evaluation costs, and
 different optimal cutoff points for each manager. Restrictive assumptions have
 to be imposed to generate some comparative results, as in proposition 6 of Koh
 [1992].
 4. Conclusion
 The results reported here extend the work in Sah and Stiglitz [1986] and
 Koh [1992]. In a hierarchy, a project is accepted if and only if every manager
 approves the project; inspection stops as soon as bad review is received. In a
 polyarchy, a project is rejected if and only if every manager rejects the project;
 inspection stops when a good review is received. In a committee, acceptance
 is based on the number of good reviews exceeding a minimum acceptance
 consensus, as discussed in Sah and Stiglitz [1988] and Koh [1991]. The
 hierarchy and polyarchy are clearly suboptimal, while the committee may be
 preferable if there is a time constraint for screening projects, so that inspec-
 tion can be carried out simultaneously by all the managers to expedite evalua-
 tion.
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 Zusammenfassung
 Typischerweise unterlaufen Individuen bei der Auswertung von Informationen
 Fehler. In diesem Beitrag analysieren wir das Problem der optimalen Projekt-
 wahl unter der Annahme, daß fehlbare Manager Projekte der Reihe nach
 bewerten und voneinander unabhängige Meinungen über deren Qualität abge-
 ben. Die Leistungsfähigkeit der Organisationstypen Hierarchie und Polyarchie
 wird verglichen, wenn n(n > 2) Manager die Projekte bewerten. Existierende
 Ergebnisse über optimale Auswahlmechanismen werden verallgemeinert und
 die optimale Organisationsgröße charakterisiert. Es wird ferner gezeigt, welche
 Wirkung eine Änderung der Projektqualität auf die relative Vorteilhaftigkeit
 der beiden sequentiellen Entscheidungsprozesse hat. Schließlich werden die
 Wirkungen variabler Bewertungskosten auf die optimale Entscheidungsregel
 diskutiert.
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